South Carolina Law Review
Volume 64
Issue 4 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW

Article 4

Summer 2013

Magnolia North v. Heritage Communities: The South Carolina
Court of Appeals' End Run Around the Necessity of Equitable
Justification when Disregarding the Corporate Form
Phillips L. McWilliams

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Phillips L. McWilliams, Magnolia North v. Heritage Communities: The South Carolina Court of Appeals'
End Run Around the Necessity of Equitable Justification when Disregarding the Corporate Form, 64 S. C.
L. Rev. 849 (2013).

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

McWilliams: Magnolia North v. Heritage Communities: The South Carolina Court

M4GNOLIA NORTH V.HERIT4GE COMUNITIEs:

THE SOUTH CAROLINA COUTRT OF APPEALS' END RIN AROUTND THE
NECESSITY OF EQUITABLE JUSTIFICATION WHEN DISREGARDING THE
CORPORATE FORM

1.

INTRODUCTION .................................. ......................
825

11.

CORPORATE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA......................

....... 826

4. CorporateFormationand Rights in South Carolina

..

B.

l ..

826

......................... 828

The Purpose ofLimited Liability

C. Recognized Doctrines for Ignoring the Corporate Form in South
Carolina .........

.. 83 1

111. DISPENSING WITI THE EQUITY REQUIREMENT WHEN IGNORING THE
CORPORATE FORM

4.
B.
C.
D.
E.

................................................

Facts of Magnolia Northo......
ProceduralHistory ofMagnolia North ....................
Holding in Magnolia North ........................
The Rise of 4malgamation in South Carolina
4malgamation in Other 4reas of the Law

IV. THE IMPACT OF AMALGAMATION

V. CONCLUSION

1.

834
835
837
.. 837
.. 840

.
.......

841

.................................

4. Elements ofAmalgamation
B. Known Effects of 4algamation g
C. PossibleEffects ofAmalgamation
D.
Guidancefor Practitioners

834

..
......
.............

841
842
845

...................................

846

...........................................

...... 846

INTRODUCTION
When is the judiciary justified in taking away a statutory right? In its 2012

decision in Magnolia North Property Owners' Ass'n v. Heritage Communities,
Inc., the South Carolina Court of Appeals "amalgamated" three corporations,
holding the corporations liable as a single entity and thereby disregarding the
corporations' statutory protection from extracorporate liability. 2 This Comment
demonstrates that it is well-established in South Carolina law that courts will
disregard statutory rights in the corporate context only upon the showing of an

equitable justification of considerable magnitude-one

sufficient to justify

1. 397 S.C. 348, 725 S.E.2d 112 (Ct. App. 2012), petitionfbr cert.filed, No. 2005-CP-260044 (S.C. May 21, 2012).
2.
Id. at 358-60, 725 S.E.2d at 117-18: see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-3-102 (2006)
(establishing the corporation as a separate and distinct legal entity).
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setting aside a legislative enactment.
This Comment argues that no such
equitable justification was established in Magnolia North, creating precedent that
dangerously dilutes the long-standing statutory protection of corporations from
extracorporate liability.
Part 11 of this Comment discusses corporate law in South Carolina, the
policy behind limited liability, and the rules the South Carolina Supreme Court
has outlined for imposing tort liability on a company or its managers by ignoring
legally formed entities. Part III addresses, in detail, the facts, procedural history,
and holding of Magnolia North and briefly discusses the cases that gave rise to
the amalgamation doctrine. Part IV analyzes the impact of amalgamation on
South Carolina law and provides a synthesis of the law regarding the
amalgamation doctrine. Part V calls on the South Carolina Supreme Court either
to set more arduous, discernible standards for the doctrine or recognize that the
doctrine has no place in South Carolina jurisprudence.
II. CORPORATE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA
4. CorporateFormationand Rights in South Carolina
In South Carolina, as in every state, corporations have a statutory right to be
liable only for their own obligations.' This right allows South Carolina business

3.
See e.g., Drury Dev. Corp. v. Found. Ins. Co., 380 S.C. 97, 101, 668 S.E.2d 798, 800
(2008) ("[E]quitable principles govern the veil-piercing remedy, and '[i]t is settled authority that the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is not to be applied without substantial reflection." (quoting
Sturkie v. Sifly, 280 S.C. 453, 457. 313 S.E.2d 316. 318 (Ct. App. 1984))).
4.
Compare Magnolia North, 397 S.C. at 358-60. 725 S.E.2d at 117-18 (upholding the
amalgamation of three corporations), with Stephen B. Presser, he Bogalusa Explosion, "Single
Business Enterprise," "Alter Ego" and Other Errors: Academics, Economics, Democracy, and
ShareholderLimited Liability: Back Towards a Unitary "Abuse" Theory of Piercingthe Corporate
Veil, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 405, 407 (2006) ("It is, or at least once was and ought again to be,
hornbook law that a shareholder or a parent corporation should not lose the protection of limited
liability unless that shareholder or parent has somehow 'abused' the corporate form."), and S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-3-102 (establishing the corporation as a separate and distinct legal entity).
5. See S.C. CODE ANN.
33-3-102 (making each properly formed corporation a separate
jural person-that is, separate from its shareholders and separate from its affiliates, both
horizontally and vertically); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10A-2-3.02 (LexisNexis 2010) (establishing
that, unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a corporation "has the same powers
as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs"); GA.
CODE ANN. § 14-2-302 (2003) (same): N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-3-02(a) (2011) (same); see also
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-6-220(b) ("[A] shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the
acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become personally liable by reason of his own
acts or conduct."); Mid-S. Mgmt. Co. v. Sherwood Dev. Corp., 374 S.C. 588, 597, 649 S.E.2d 135,
140 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Hunting v. Elders, 359 S.C. 217, 223, 597 S.E.2d 803, 806 (Ct. App.
2004)) ("It is generally recognized that a corporation is an entity that is separate and distinct from.
and its debts are not the individual debts of, its officers and stockholders."); Presser, supra note 4, at
406-07 (noting that every American jurisdiction "permits separate incorporation," and asserting
that, under traditional hornbook law, shareholders and parent corporations enjoy limited liability
unless the corporate form is abused).
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owners to organize their businesses in more than one corporation for the express
purpose of limiting liability.6 The courts may disregard the corporate form only
when a sufficiently powerful equitable justification is present.7
The procedure required to form a corporation in South Carolina is not
complicated or difficult. A corporation may be formed for "the purpose of
engaging in any lawful business."
All that is necessary to lawfully form a
corporation-in addition to a lawful business purpose-is the filing of articles of
incorporation with the South Carolina Secretary of State.
A properly formed corporation is, by statute, a jural person separate from its
shareholders and affiliates, both horizontally and vertically. 10 In creating this
legal entity, the South Carolina General Assembly gave corporations specific
Among those is the shareholders' right of limited liability.
statutory rights.
Just as the shareholders and affiliates of a corporation are not liable for the debts
of the corporation, the corporation is not liable for the debts of its shareholders
and affiliates.
Thus, a properly formed corporation in South Carolina is liable

6.
See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-1-200, 33-3-102, 33-6-220(b); see also Mid-South, 374 S.C.
at 595, 597, 606, 649 S.E.2d at 139, 140, 145 (holding that, when a subsidiary, which, according to
one expert, was created for the "legitimate business reasons of reducing risk and exposure to
liability," paid off a debt to its parent corporation and was then unable to satisfy a judgment, the
court could neither pierce the corporate veil nor apply the alter ego or amalgamation doctrines to
hold the parent corporation liable); Presser, supra note 4, at 406-07 (noting that every American
jurisdiction "permits separate incorporation for the very purpose of limiting liability"); Walkovszky
v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 7-10 (1966) (explaining that there is nothing fraudulent about dividing a
business into multiple corporations for the sole purpose of limiting liability and, thus, the court
could not ignore the corporate form and pierce the corporate veil-indeed, with some limitations,
"[t]he law permits the incorporation of a business for the very purpose of enabling its proprietors to
escape personal liability").
7.
See sources cited supra note 3.
8.
S.C. CODE ANN. 33-3-101. However, the purpose of the corporation can be limited if
a more limited purpose is set forth in the articles of incorporation." Id.
9.
In general, "the corporate existence begins when the articles of incorporation are filed,"
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-2-103(a), and the filing of the articles of incorporation by the Secretary of
State serves as "conclusive proof that the incorporators satisfied all conditions precedent to
incorporation," id. § 33-2-103(b). This "conclusive proof' is subject to one exception: "a
proceeding by the State to cancel or revoke the incorporation or involuntarily dissolve the
corporation." Id.
10. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-3-102 (asserting that a corporation "has the same powers as an
individual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs"); see also
sources cited supra note 5 (explaining that corporations are separate and distinct from its
shareholders).
11. See id. § 33-3-102(1}-(15).
12. See S.C. CODE ANN. 33-6-220(b) ("[A] shareholder of a corporation is not personally
liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become personally liable by reason
of his own acts or conduct.").
13. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-3-102; see also Mid-S. Mgmt. Co. v. Sherwood Dev. Corp.,
374 S.C. 588, 597, 649 S.E.2d 135, 140 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Hunting v. Elders, 359 S.C. 217,
223, 597 S.E.2d 803, 806 (Ct. App. 2004)) (noting the distinction between corporate debts and the
debts of individual shareholders); Carroll v. Snith-Henry, Inc., 281 S.C. 104, 106-07, 313 S.E.2d
649, 651 (Ct. App. 1984) (reversing the trial court for refusing to provide a requested jury
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only for its own obligations. 1 Indeed, a corporation in South Carolina can be
created for the express purpose of limiting liability.
The doctrine of amalgamation takes away this statutory right without the
equitable justification required for courts to disregard the corporate form. 16 This
significantly lowers the previously established standard and fundamentally alters
businesses' ability to limit their liability by separately incorporating segments of
a business.17
The case law on the doctrine of amalgamation is limited. 8 No other state
has expressly adopted the doctrine, although several states, most notably Texas
and Louisiana, have applied a conceptually similar doctrine titled "single
business enterprise."' However, the Texas Supreme Court recently rejected the
doctrine, noting that absent "evidence of abuse, or ... injustice and inequity,,20
ignoring the corporate form "would seriously compromise what we have called a
'bedrock principle of corporate law'-that a legitimate purpose for forming a
corporation is to limit individual liability for the corporation's obligations."'
B.

The Purpose ofLimited Liability

Corporations have long enjoyed the protection of limited liability.22 This
protection gives meaning to the corporate form by protecting investors and

instruction when, without the instruction, "the jury might well have concluded that a parent
corporation is always liable on its subsidiary's contracts").
14. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
15. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Although a corporation can be formed to limit
liability. most corporations are formed with knowledge of other benefits the corporate form will
provide, such as tax benefits. See FRANK I. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL. THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 251 (1991).

16. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (explaining that a substantial equitable
justification must be established before a South Carolina court may disregard the statutory rights of
a corporation).
17. See supra notes 3, 6 and accompanying text (establishing South Carolina's standard for
disregarding corporate rights and describing the ability of South Carolina business owners to
organize a business in multiple corporations).
18. See, e.g., Andrew Cole, Fhe New Amnalganation in South Carolina A Shortcut to
Corporate Liability?, 40 DEF. LINE, no. 2, Summer 2012, at 33, 33, available at http://www.
collinslacy.net/marketing/pdflSCDTAA CorporateLiability AndrewCole.pdf ("A recent search for
the term 'amalgamation' in South Carolina case law yields less than thirty cases on Westlaw.").
19. Presser, supra note 4, at 420-24 (citations omitted) (noting that, while Texas and
Louisiana are "the most visible" proponents of the single business enterprise theory, eleven other
states and Puerto Rico "have at least recognized the idea"). Notably, South Carolina and the
doctrine of amalgamation are not included in this list or discussed anyvwhere in Presser's article.
See id.
20. SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 455 (Tex. 2008).
21. Id. (quoting Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 271 (Tex. 2006)).
22. See, e.g., Presser,supra note 4, at 407 ("It is, or at least once was and ought again to be,
hombook law that a shareholder or a parent corporation should not lose the protection of limited
liability unless that shareholder has somehow 'abused' the corporate form.").
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encouraging capital formation. Limited liability only protects the corporation's
owners, not the corporation itself. 4 Still, the practice often comes under
attack.25 The general theme of arguments against limited liability is that it
encourages corporations to engage in risky activities without adequate regard for
the harm those activities will cause.26
Yet, the practice endures. Some commentators argue that limited liability is
still the norm in America because it is a better practice than any alternative
proposals.
Indeed, in the early twentieth century, the president of Columbia
University proclaimed that "the 'limited liability corporation' was 'the greatest
single discovery of modern times." 28 Furthermore, if legislatures had not
created limited liability, then corporations would limit their liability by
contract.
Thus, making limited liability the statutory rule simply enables the
parties involved to reach the same result at a lower cost.30
Other justifications for limited liability include promoting efficient corporate
governance, encouraging investing, and pooling of capital.
If shareholders are
personally liable for the debts of the corporation, then they will understandably
want to take an active part in management.32 That system would not be
conducive to running a large organization where operational efficiency requires a
centralized decisionmaking process.
This would entail more costs for the
corporation, thus raising the costs for the shareholders. 34 Furthermore,

23. See, e.g., STEPHEN M.BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW ANDECONOMICS §4.1, at 126,
§ 4.2. at 136 (2002) (noting that limited liability shields shareholders from corporate debts or torts,

and asserting that personal liability in the corporate context would cause "higher costs of capital,
which in turn would harm society by inhibiting economic growth").
24. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 15, at 11 ("Limited liability' means only that
those who contribute equity capital to a firm risk no more than their initial investments-it is an
attribute of the investment rather than of 'the corporation. ").
25. See Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of UninitedLiability: A Capital Mlarkets
Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 387 (1992) (citations omitted) (collecting sources that have
critiqued the doctrine of limited liability).
26. Presser, supra note 4, at 410.
27. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 25, at 420 ("[Limited liability] is not a thing of perfect
beauty, but at least it works. In contrast, proportionate liability
is not a practical
alternative .... ").
28. Presser, supra note 4. at 409 (quoting STEPHEN B. PRESSER. PIERCING THE CORPORATE
VEIL § 1:1 (14th ed. 2004)).
29.

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 15, at 40-4 1.

30. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, § 4.2, at 131 (noting that when transactions costs related
to contracting for limited liability are high, parties "cannot depend on private contracting to achieve
efficient outcomes," but instead "legal rules must function as a substitute for private bargaining").
31. See generally id. §§ 4.1-4.2 (discussing various justifications for providing corporations
with limited liability).
32. See id. § 4.2, at 135-36.
33. See id. §4.2, at 135.
34.

See id.; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 15, at 5 (noting the connection

between corporate governance and returns to shareholders).
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shareholders would spend too much time monitoring their investment, leaving
them unable to maintain other employment.
Limited liability also benefits creditors. In an unlimited liability scheme, it
would be too costly for a creditor to bring individual suits against every
shareholder spread throughout the nation.36 Not only would issues arise with
choice of law and jurisdiction, but creditors would have to constantly monitor
the various shareholders' credit, as the creditors would rely on each
shareholder's ability to repay the debt.3 A scheme of joint and several liability
would simply shift the cost of collection to the solvent shareholders, who would
seek contribution from those shareholders unable to pay their share.
Just as
bringing suit individually against every shareholder is cost prohibitive for
creditors, it would be cost prohibitive for tort claimants harmed by a
corporation'sactions.
These arguments appear tailor-made to justify a limited liability scheme for
large corporations but seem ill-suited to the smaller close corporation run
directly by the shareholders. However, limited liability was originally developed
not only to promote economic growth through efficient corporate governance but
also to encourage those with less means to form and grow corporations. 40
Indeed, it appears that limited liability envisions the lone entrepreneur who not
only invested in but also managed the corporation. 1 Limited liability allows
people with less wealth to develop their businesses when it would otherwise be
cost-prohibitive to do so.42 Without limited liability, only the wealthy could
afford to create corporations.
The South Carolina General Assembly undoubtedly intended to encourage
business growth when it conferred limited liability on corporations.
The
doctrine's manifestation in the South Carolina Business Corporation Act is a
reflection of a public policy choice by the legislature.45 Thus, the courts must
provide substantial justification for ignoring this statutory right.

35. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, § 4.2, at 135.
36. See id 4.2, at 137.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id 4.2, at 137, 141.
40. See Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation:Limited Liability,
Democracy, and Economics, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 155-56, 171-72 (1992).
41. See id at 174.
42. See id. at 155-56.
43. See id.
44. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-3-102 (2006) (establishing the corporation as a
separate legal entity); see also Presser, supra note 40, at 155 (asserting that, in the nineteenth
century, certain state legislators viewed limited liability as a way to fuel economic growth).
45. See S.C. CODE ANN,. 33-1-101. Title 33 of the South Carolina Code is commonly
referred to as the "South Carolina Business Corporation Act of 1988." Id.
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C. Recognized Doctrines for Ignoring the Corporate Form in South
Carolina
The South Carolina Supreme Court has employed only two doctrines for
ignoring the corporate form: piercing the corporate veil and alter ego.46 While
the doctrines are not the same, the "alter ego doctrine is merely a means of
piercing the corporate veil." 47 Thus, both alter ego and piercing the corporate
veil require a showing that, in giving effect to the corporate form, the court
would "protect fraud, justify wrong, or defeat public policy."4 A court must be
able to point to a sufficiently powerful equitable justification when disregarding
the corporate form.4 9
The seminal case for ignoring the corporate form in South Carolina
corporate jurisprudence is Sturkie v. Sifly.%o In Sturkie, the court outlined a twopart test to decide whether the corporate form should be ignored, thus subjecting
the shareholders to tort liability'
The first prong of the test requires the court to
analyze eight factors to determine whether the shareholders observed corporate
formalities.5 Those eight factors are:
(1) whether the corporation was grossly undercapitalized; (2) failure to
observe corporate formalities; (3) non-payment of dividends; (4)
insolvency of the debtor corporation at the time; (5) siphoning of funds
of the corporation by the dominant stockholder; (6) non-functioning of
other officers or directors; (7) absence of corporate records; and (8) the
fact that the corporation was merely a facade for the operations of the
dominant stockholder.

46. Drury Dev. Corp. v. Found. Ins. Co., 380 S.C. 97, 101 n.1, 668 S.E.2d 798, 800 n.1
(2008).
47. Id. (quoting 18 C.J.S. Corporations§ 23 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. See, e.g., id. at 101, 668 S.E.2d at 800 (quoting Sturkie v. Sifly, 280 S.C. 453, 457, 313
S.E.2d 316. 318 (Ct. App. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Colleton Cnty.
Taxpayers Ass'n v. Sch. Dist. of Colleton Cnty., 371 S.C. 224, 237, 638 S.E.2d 685, 692 (2006)
(citing Baker v. Equitable Leasing Corp., 275 S.C. 359, 367-68, 271 S.E.2d 596, 600 (1980))
(concluding that in order to prevail in an alter ego claim, "[i]t is necessary [for the plaintift] to show
that the retention of separate corporate personalities would promote fraud, wrong or injustice, or
would contravene public policy").
49. See Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 458, 313 S.E.2dat 319.
50. 280 S.C. 453, 313 S.E.2d 316. The two-pronged test that South Carolina courts apply
when deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil is almost always attributed to Sturkie. See, e.g.,
Drurv 380 S.C. at 102, 668 S.E.2d at 800 (citing Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 457-58, 313 S.E.2d at 318)
(referring to the South Carolina Court of Appeals' adoption ofthe two-pronged test).
51. See Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 457-58. 313 S.E.2d at 318.
52. Id. (citing DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681. 687
(4th Cir. 1976) (Russell, J.)).
53. Cumberland Wood Prods. v. Bennett, 308 S.C. 268, 271, 417 S.E.2d 617, 619 (Ct. App.
1992) (citing C.T. Lowndes & Co. v. Suburban Gas & Appliance Co., 307 S.C. 394, 397, 415
S.E.2d 404 405 (Ct. App. 1991) Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 457, 313 S.E.2d at 318).
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The plaintiff does not need to prove all eight factors in order to satisfy the
first prong.54 Presumably, the courts originally gave equal weight to each
factor. However, subsequent South Carolina decisions held that some of the
56
Sturkie factors are less important.
The less important factors include: the
nonpayment of dividends; the failure to observe corporate formalities; the
nonfunctioning of other officers or other directors; and the absence of corporate
records.57
The second prong of the test requires the party seeking to pierce the
corporate veil to demonstrate that, unless the corporate form is ignored, injustice
or fundamental unfairness will ensue. The second prong is harder to prove,59
and
[t]he burden of proving fundamental unfairness requires that the plaintiff
establish (1) that the defendant was aware of the plaintiffs claim against
the corporation, and (2) thereafter, the defendant acted in a self-serving
manner with regard to the property of the corporation and in disregard
of the plaintiff s claim in the property.6 0
To establish that the defendant is aware of the plaintiff s claim, the plaintiff
must establish either the defendant's actual knowledge or "notice of facts which,
if pursued with due diligence, would lead to knowledge of the claim."6 1 Courts
have further clarified that "[t]he essence of the fairness test is simply that an
individual businessman cannot be allowed to hide from the normal consequences
of carefree entrepreneuring by doing so through a corporate shell."6 2 Essentially,
the corporate form may not be abused by its shareholders.

54. See, e.g., Hunting v. Elders, 359 S.C. 217, 224 25, 597 S.E.2d 803, 807 (Ct. App. 2004)
(quoting Dumas v. InfoSafe Corp., 320 S.C. 188, 192, 463 S.E.2d 641, 644 (Ct. App. 1995)).
55. See id. at 225. 597 S.E.2d at 807 (citing Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 457-58. 313 S.E.2d at 318).
56. Id. (citing Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 457-58, 313 S.E.2d at 318).
57. Id.
58. Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 457 58. 313 S.E.2d at 318 (citing DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W.
Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 687 (4th Cir. 1976)).
59. In Sturkie, the court held that, absent any evidence of fraud, an unsatisfied judgment
against the corporation was not sufficient injustice or fundamental unfairness to meet this burden,
despite the plaintiff proving that the defendant "breach[ed] the integrity of the corporation." Id. at
458, 313 S.E.2d at 319; see also STEPHEN B. PRESSER. PIERcING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 2:45, at
810 (2012 ed.). The facts in Sturkie "seem to show undercapitalization, siphoning of funds or
assets, and ain egregious lack of corporate formalities, but, according to the court of appeals, they
were not enough to justify piercing the veil." Id.
60. Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 459, 313 S.E.2d at 319.
61. Hunting, 359 S.C. at 229, 597 S.E.2d at 809 (citing Multimedia Publ'g of S.C., Inc. v.
Mullins, 314 S.C. 551, 554, 431 S.E.2d 569, 572 (1993)).
62. Dumas v. InfoSafe Corp., 320 S.C. 188, 192-93, 463 S.E.2d 641, 644 (Ct. App. 1995)
(citing Addtinedia Publ'g. 314 S.C. at 556, 431 S.E.2d at 573).
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In order to prevail under an alter ego claim the plaintiff must show "total
domination and control" of one corporate entity by another. There must be so
much control or domination that "the subservient entity manifests no separate
interest of its own and functions solely to achieve the goals of the dominant
entity." 64 Similar to piercing the corporate veil, the alter ego doctrine can apply
only where there is a showing of "fraud or misuse of control by the dominant
entity which results in some injustice."6 5
South Carolina courts have not clarified injustice in the context of the alter
ego doctrine as they have fundamental unfairness in piercing cases. However,
the South Carolina Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he alter ego doctrine is
merely a means of piercing the corporate veil."67 Thus, the misuse and control
that result in injustice clearly must meet the same standard of fundamental
unfairness or fraud that courts have outlined for piercing the corporate veil: (1)
the corporation must be aware of the plaintiffs claims, and (2) the corporation
must act in a self-serving manner with regard to its assets in disregard of the
plaintiffs claims to the assets.6 8
South Carolina courts have always required a substantial equitable
justification to ignore the corporate form. A corporation's inability to satisfy a
judgment against it, absent fraud, is not substantial injustice or fundamental
unfairness and is not a sufficiently powerful equitable justification for a court to
disregard the corporate form.0 South Carolina Supreme Court jurisprudence has
required much more before ignoring the corporate form, and this standard for
imposing extracorporate liability is well-settled.7 However, a recent, significant
opinion may totally alter this area of the law, as a new, unsettling precedent has
been set.

63. Colleton Cnty. Taxpayers Ass'n v. Sch. Dist. of Colleton Cnty., 371 S.C. 224, 237, 638
S.E.2d 685, 692 (2006) (citing Peoples Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Myrtle Beach Golf & Yacht
Club. 310 S.C. 132. 148. 425 S.E.2d 764, 774 (Ct. App. 1992)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Drury Dev. Corp. v. Found. Ins. Co., 380 S.C. 97, 101, 668 S.E.2d 798, 800 (2008).
67. Id. at 101 n.1, 668 S.E.2d at 800 n.1 (quoting 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 23 (2007))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
68. See Sturkie v. Sifly, 280 S.C. 453, 459, 313 S.E.2d 316, 319 (Ct. App. 1984).
69. Id. at 458. 313 S.E.2d at 319.
70. Id.
71. See Drury, 380 S.C. at 101 n.1, 668 S.E.2d at 800 n.j (quoting 18 C.J.S. Corporations
§ 23 (2007)), see also Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 457, 313 S.E.2d at 318 (citing Baker v. Equitable Leasing
Corp., 275 S.C. 359, 367, 271 S.E.2d 596, 600 (1980)) ("It is settled authority that the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil is not to be applied without substantial reflection.").
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111. DISPENSING WITH THE EQUITY REQUIREMENT WHEN IGNORING THE
CORPORATE FORM

4. Facts of Magnolia North
Heritage Communities, Inc. (HCI) filed articles of incorporation with the
South Carolina Secretary of State on February 19, 1993." HCI was a real estate
development company that formed subsidiary corporations to facilitate its
development projects. 3 HCI was the overall developer of the condominium
project named the Magnolia North Horizontal Property Regime.
Heritage Magnolia North, Inc. (HMN) filed articles of incorporation on May
8. 1998.7 HMN was a subsidiary of HCI organized so that the development
project, Magnolia North, could contain its own expenses and construction
management, and could thus operate as a "cost center.";6 HMN held the title to
the property and sold the condominiums to buyers.
Buildstar Corporation (Buildstar) filed articles of incorporation on March
25, 1997. Buildstar-another subsidiary of HCI-was the general contractor in
charge of construction at Magnolia North.79 However, Buildstar did not actually
build any of the condominium project it merely supervised and subcontracted
out all the construction work.s0
The three corporations shared corporate officers and directors. 1 At varying
times, Roger Van Wie, Patty Van Wie, Jack Green, and Lynn Anderson were all
on the board of directors for HCL 8 2 Roger Van Wie and Jack Green were also
officers of Buildstar.83 Roger Van Wie was also the President and CEO of
HCI.84 Additionally, Roger Van Wie oversaw Buildstar's operations.
The
78

72. S.C. Business Filings for Heritage Communities, Inc., S.C. SECRETARY STATE,
http://www.sos.sc.gov/index.asp'n=18&p=4&s=18&corporateid=216139 (last updated Mar. 14,
2013, 6:02 PM).
73. Transcript of Deposition of William Gwyn Hardister at 34, Magnolia N. Prop. Owners'
Ass'n v. Heritage Cmtys., Inc., 397 S.C. 348, 725 S.E.2d 112 (Ct. App. 2012), petition for cert.
filed, No. 2005-CP-26-0044 (S.C. May 21, 2012) [hereinafter Hardister Deposition].
74. Brief of Appellants at 1. MlagnoliaNorth, 397 S.C. 348. 725 S.E.2d 112, petitionfor cert.
filed, No. 2005-CP-26-0044 (S.C. May 21, 2012).
75. S.C. Business Filings for Heritage Magnolia North, Inc., S.C. SECRETARY STATE, http://
www.sos.sc.gov/index.asp?n=18&p= 4 &s=18&corporateid=289761 (last updated Mar. 14, 2013,
6:02 PM).
76. Hardister Deposition, supra note 73, at 34, 41.
77. Id. at 43-44.
78. S.C. Business Filings for Buildstar Corp., S.C. SECRETARY STATE. http://ww.sos.sc.
gov/index.aspn= I8&p=4&s= 18&corporateid=269637 (last updated Mar. 14, 2013, 6:02 PM).
79. Hardister Deposition, supra note 73, at 32-33.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 35.
82. Id. at30 301.
83. Id. at 32.
84. Id. at 12.
85. Id. at 33.
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officers and directors of these corporations often switched around, but in effect,
the same individuals were in charge of the three corporations.86 All three
corporations shared the same address and telephone number.87 Additionally,
HCI and Buildstar shared employees. 8
In 1998, construction began on the Magnolia North condominium
complex. 89 The complex contained twenty-five buildings, of which the
defendants built twenty-one. 90 Each building contained twelve, thirteen, or
fifteen units.91
Magnolia North, like other HCI developments, began to experience water
intrusion issues.92 At Magnolia North's first homeowners' association meeting
on March 8, 2000, HCI officials acknowledged issues with the roadways and
leaking balconies and windows, and made promises to fix the issues.
Condominium purchasers also received the Heritage Communities Warranty
Manual at their closings.94 This warranty promised that HCI would repair
construction defects.9 5 When condominium owners contacted HCI about
construction issues. HCI worked diligently to deal with the issues right up until it
declared bankruptcy.96
In January 2001, when HCI declared bankruptcy, the officers and directors
of HCI were also the directors of the homeowners' association. 97 On September
9, 2002, HCI gave control of the homeowners' association to the plaintiffs.9
Another developer eventually took over the complex and completed the
project. 99

B. Procedural History of Magnolia North
On May 28, 2003, the Magnolia North Property Owners' Association (POA)
filed suit in Horry County, South Carolina, over defects in the construction of the

86. Id. at 41. When asked if the corporations "were essentially owned and operated by the
same officers and directors," HCI's former Chief Operating Officer and Senior Vice President
answered in the affirmative. Id
87. Id at 40.
88. Id. at 50.
89. Magnolia N. Prop. Owvners' Ass'n v. Heritage Cntys., Inc., 397 S.C. 348. 356, 725
S.E.2d 112, 117 (Ct. App. 2012), petitionfbr cert. filed, No. 2005-CP-26-0044 (S.C. May 21, 2012).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id at 361, 725 S.E.2d at 119.
93. Hardister Deposition, supra note 73, at 64 70.
94. Id. at 42.
95. Id. at 43.
96. Id at 42-43, 51.
97. Magnolia North, 397 S.C. at 356. 725 S.E.2d at 117.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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Magnolia North Horizontal Property Regime in Myrtle Beach. 00
The
defendants were HCI, HMN, and Buildstar.101 POA amended the complaint
eight times; the final amended complaint filed on February 24, 2009, alleged
four main claims: (1) negligence and gross negligence against HCI, HMN, and
Buildstar; (2) breach of express warranty against HCI; (3) breach of implied
warranty of workmanlike service against Buildstar; and (4) breach of fiduciary
duty against HCI and HMN.102 Most importantly for purposes of this Comment,
the eighth amended complaint contained an allegation that the prior complaints
did not: that HCI, HMN. and Buildstar "have been formed and operated so their
legal distinction is blurred and they are amalgamated."103
A related class action lawsuit was filed on January 5, 2005, but the class was
decertified by the trial court and the claims of the named plaintiff were dismissed
as time-barred.1o4 The original suit went to trial on May 11, 2009.105 At the
close of the plaintiffs case, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for a
directed verdict as to the breach of express warranty claim but denied all other
claims. 106
Before hearing the arguments on the defendants' directed verdict motion, the
trial court ruled that the three corporate defendants were to be considered a
single corporation "because the evidence has revealed an amalgamation of the
corporate interest, the entities, and activities so as to blur the legal distinction
between the corporation and their activities."10 While the trial court purportedly
reached this ruling by looking at all the evidence, it is clear that the court relied
mainly on the testimony contained in a deposition given by HCIs former
president and chief operating officer, Gwyn Hardister. 0 8
At the close of the defendants' case-in-chief, both sides moved for directed
verdicts. 109 The court granted the plaintiffs motions on the negligence and
breach of implied warranty of workmanlike service claims.110 The remaining
claim for breach of fiduciary duty went to the jury, which found the defendants
liable and awarded the plaintiff $6,500,000 in damages and another $2,000,000

100. Complaint at 1-8, Magnolia North, 397 S.C. 348, 725 S.E.2d 112 (No. 03-CP-26-3202),
petitionfor cert. filed, No. 2005-CP-26-0044 (S.C. May 21, 2012).
101. Id. at 1.
102. Eighth Amended Complaint at 1-7. Magnolia -North,397 S.C. 348, 725 S.E.2d 112 (No.
2003-CP-26-3203), petitionfor cert.filed, No. 2005-CP-26-0044 (S.C. May 21, 2012).
103. Id. at 2.
104. Brief of Appellants, supra note 74, at 2.
105. Magnolia Morth, 397 S.C. at 357, 725 S.E.2d at 117.
106. Id.
107. Transcript of Record at 895-99, Magnolia -North,397 S.C. 348, 725 S.E.2d 112 (No. 03CP-26-3202). petitionfor cert.filed, No. 2005-CP-26-0044 (S.C. May 21, 2012).
108. See id. at 899 (stating that the amalgamation of corporate interests was "pointed out
through Mr. Hardister's testimony").
109. Magnolia North, 397 S.C. at 357, 725 S.E.2d at 117.
110. Id.
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in punitive damages. I
Subsequently, the defendants filed five post-trial
motions, all of which were denied except for the motion for set off.11
C. Holding in Magnolia North
On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
ruling and denied the defendants' petition for a rehearing.'1
The court gave
almost no analysis justifying the ruling but did note that the "case involves
several indicia of an amalgamation of interests."114 The indicia mentioned by
the court were a shared location, telephone number, board members, officers,
employees, and the warranty manual that held HCI out as the corporation
responsible for construction defects.
The defendants' petition for certiorari is,
at the time of this writing, pending before the South Carolina Supreme Court.116
D. The Rise ofAmalgamation in South Carolina
The court's application of the doctrine of amalgamation was not
unprecedented.
In fact, the court of appeals created the doctrine of
amalgamation in 1986 in Kincaid v. Landing Development Corp. ' In Kincaid,
the plaintiffs purchased a lot to build their single-family home from the
defendant developer.118 A sister corporation of the developer, the defendant
sales and marketing agent, sold the home to the plaintiffs. 19 The developer
subsequently contracted with another sister corporation, the defendant

111. Verdict Form at 1-2, Magnolia -North,397 S.C. 348, 725 S.E.2d 112 (No. 2003-CP-263203), petitionfor cert.filed, No. 2005-CP-26-0044 (S.C. May 21, 2012).
112. Order Denying Defendants' Post Trial Motions and Granting Defendants' Motion for a
Set Off, Mlagnolia -North,397 S.C. 348. 725 S.E.2d 112, petition for cert. filed, No. 2005-CP-260044 (S.C. May 21, 2012).
113. Magnolia North, 397 S.C. at 358, 725 S.E.2d at 116-17.
114. Id. at 359, 725 S.E.2d at 118.
115. Id. at 360, 725 S.E.2d at 118. Notably, the court never analyzed whether the defendants
adhered to corporate formalities. It is also significant that the plaintiffs were aware that HCI was
the only company responsible for construction defects. See id. The warranty manual given to each
honeowner at their closings notified the plaintiffs of such an arrangement. See supra note 94 and
accompany ing text. This was part of the bargained-for consideration of the transaction. See id.
There are no allegations that the corporations engaged in any misleading or fraudulent activity.
Nothing in the record supports the proposition that the plaintiffs were confused as to wlio was
responsible for construction defects or that the plaintiffs were aware that the corporations shared
locations, officers, and employees. While the court, in hindsight, identified indicia that might prove
a blurring of entities, there is no evidence that the plaintiffs could identify these same indicia
beforehand. See id. at 360. 725 S.E.2d at 118.
116. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mlagnolia North, 397 S.C. 348, 725 S.E.2d 112 (Ct. App.
2012), petitionfor cert.filed, No. 2005-CP-26-0044 (S.C. May 21, 2012).
117. Kincaid v. Landing Dev. Corp., 289 S.C. 89, 96, 344 S.E.2d 869, 874 (Ct. App. 1986).
118. Id. at 92, 344 S.E.2d at 871.
119. Id.
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construction company, for the construction of the home.12 0 After finding
construction defects in the home, the plaintiffs brought suit against all three
corporations for negligent construction and breach of warranty.
The court of
appeals noted that the three corporations had the same corporate officers,122
shareholders, and location; distributed literature that described the sales and
marketing company as a company that developed, sold, and managed property;
and that customers could contact any one of the three corporations to register a
complaint.'
Based on these factors, the court of appeals agreed with the trial
court's ruling that the "evidence revealed 'an amalgamation of corporate
interests, entities, and activities so as to blur the legal distinction between the
corporations and their activities."' 1
The next case to address amalgamation was Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber &
Manufacturing Co.125 In Kennedy, the South Carolina Supreme Court did not
extend liability for construction defects to a lender who was not involved in the
construction of a home.126 However, the court noted that the lender could
possibly be held liable for the defects for several reasons, including, for example,
if the lender "is so amalgamated with the developer or builder so as to blur its
legal distinction."
The doctrine of amalgamation appeared to be an anomaly in South Carolina
corporate jurisprudence until it was revived nearly two decades later in MfidSouth Management Co. v. Sherwood Development Corp. 8 Mid-South involved
a dispute over a settlement payment with a third-party homeowner's association
for construction defects. 129 The settlement was paid by the plaintiff who
developed the project as a joint venture with the defendant corporation.13 0 The
defendant corporation refused to pay a capital call for its portion of the
settlement, and the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant corporation and its

120.

Id
121. See id. at 91, 344 S.E.2d at 871.
122. Id at 96, 344 S.E.2d at 874. Interestingly, Roger Van Wie, who was an officer of all
three corporations in Magnolia North, was the vice president of all three corporations in Kincaid.
Id.; see also supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text (discussing the corporate structure of the
defendant corporations in Magnolia North).
123. Kincaid, 289 S.C. at 96, 344 S.E.2d at 874.
124. Id The court cited no precedent for this ruling and never analyzed whether the
corporations adhered to corporate formalities. See id.
125. 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d 730 (1989).
126. Id at 338-40, 384 S.E.2d at 733 (citing Roundtree Villas Ass'n v. 4701 Kings Corp., 282
S.C. 415. 321 S.E.2d 46 (1984)) (adopting the approach of Roundtree Villas and holding that a
"lender could not be held liable in tort for construction defects caused by the builder's work').
127. Id at 340, 384 S.E.2d at 734 (citing Kincaid, 289 S.C. 89, 344 S.E.2d 869). The South
Carolina Supreme Court has subsequently found a lender's involvement with a developer to be a
jury question. See Cole, supra note 18, at 35 ("[T]he [South Carolina] Supreme Court found that
the question whether a bank is so 'substantially involved' in construction of a house is a question
for the jury." (quoting Kirkman v. Parex, Inc., 369 S.C. 477, 485, 632 S.E.2d 854. 858 (2006))).
128. 374 S.C. 588, 649 S.E.2d 135 (Ct. App. 2007).
129. Id. at 594-95, 649 S.E.2d at 139.
130. Id.
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The plaintiff offered three alternative theories for holding
parent companies.
the parent companies liable: piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, or
amalgamation. 132 The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish the
requisite elements to hold the parent companies liable. 13 The amalgamation
doctrine was inapplicable because "Kincaid was not a situation in which one
company owed a judgment and the court imposed liability upon the parent
company or a shareholder." 134 The court also noted that the evidence failed to
show that the subsidiary could be confused with its parent corporations.
Thus,
there was insufficient evidence to hold the parent companies liable.136
The court of appeals again dealt with the doctrine of amalgamation in Pope
v. Heritage Communities, Inc.
Another construction defects case, the facts of
Pope mirror those of Magnolia North.18 In fact, two of the three defendants
were the same corporations as those in Magnolia North, and the third defendant
was the project-specific developer.
The corporations shared a location,
telephone number, board members, and employees, and the overall developer
held itself out as responsible for construction defects through its warranty. 140 On
these facts, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's ruling that the legal
distinction between the corporations was blurred and that "they are in effect one
and the same as far as their representation and operation and that the action of
one should apply to the others . . . because they are in effect one and the

same."

Thus, each corporation was held liable for the principal actor's torts.

131. Id.
132. Id. at 595, 649 S.E.2d at 139.
133. Id. at 606, 649 S.E.2d at 145.
134. Id. at 605, 649 S.E.2d at 144 (citing Kincaid v. Landing Dev. Corp., 289 S.C. 89, 96, 344
S.E.2d 869. 874 (Ct. App. 1986)). Notably. this language appears to place amalgamation on equal
ground with piercing the corporate veil and alter ego as a means of ignoring the corporate form. See
Cole, supra note 18, at 34. However, no court has held that amalgamation requires the powerful
equity that both piercing and alter ego require. See id. This also demonstrates the need to plead
amalgamation before obtaining a judgment.
135. Mid-South, 374 S.C. at 605, 649 S.E.2d at 145.
136. Id. Mid-South is the only case wvhere the court of appeals has analyzed the doctrine of
amalgamation and found that it did not apply. Mid-South is also the only time that amalgamation
was discussed by the court of appeals and Roger Van Wie was not ain officer of the corporations.
See supra note 122.
137. 395 S.C. 404, 717 S.E.2d 765 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for cert.filed, No. 2005-CP-263289 (S.C. Jan. 11, 2012).
138. Compare id. at 410, 717 S.E.2d at 769 (ICI and Buildstar sued for construction defects),
with Magnolia N. Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Heritage Communities, Inc., 397 S.C. 348. 356-57, 725
S.E.2d 112, 117 (Ct. App. 2012). petitionfor cert.filed, No. 2005-CP-26-0044 (S.C. May 21, 2012)
(same).
139. See supra note 138.
140. Pope, 395 S.C. at 419, 717 S.E.2d at 773.
141. Id. at 417-20. 717 S.E.2d at 772-73 (internal quotation marks omitted). There are many
similarities between Magnolia North and Pope: the same trial judge, Judge Clifton Newman,
presided over both trials; the same counsel represented the plaintiff in both cases; several of the
same attorneys represented the defendants in both matters, but not exactly the same counsel; and
two of the three court of appeals judges-Judge Geathers and Judge Short-sat on the bench for the
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The doctrine of amalgamation was on firm enough footing in South Carolina
corporate jurisprudence to be recognized by a federal district court in Babb v.

Lee County Landfill SC, LLC.142 In Babb, landowners brought an action against
the owner of a landfill, the landfill's parent company, and an affiliate
company. 143 The parent and affiliate companies provided assistance and support
to the landfill, but the court found that "each [was] a wholly distinct legal entity"
and that they were "not blurred such that they [were] in effect one and the same
as required under South Carolina law to find liability under the theory of
amalgamation of interests."1 44
E.

4inalgainationin Other Areas of the Lay

The South Carolina Supreme Court employed similar amalgamation analysis
in Ost v. Integrated Products, Inc.
Ost was a workers' compensation case
addressing whether the employees of one corporation could "amalgamate" to a
sister corporation in order to determine the number of employees for a statutory
employee analysis.146 Admittedly, the court never specifically mentioned the
doctrine of amalgamation or cited to a case that utilized the doctrine. However,
in finding that the employees were counted toward the sister corporation, the
court noted several facts similar to those considered in the amalgamation
analysis in construction defect cases, including: the employees of the sister
corporation performed tasks essential to the defendant corporation's operations,
the corporations shared corporate officers and employees, and the corporations
"intertwined their operations."1 47
Courts also appear amenable to the idea that amalgamation could be utilized
to prove service of process on a corporation. In Schenk v. National Health Care,
Inc.,148 the defendant argued that a default judgment should be set aside for lack
of proper service of process.149 Although the case was decided without utilizing
the doctrine of amalgamation, the court of appeals, in a footnote, suggested that

appeal, and each authored one of the opinions. Compare Magnolia North, 397 S.C. 348, 725 S.E.2d
112, petitionfor cert. filed, No. 2005-CP-26-0044 (S.C. May 21, 2012). with Pope, 395 S.C. 404.
717 S.E.2d 765, petitionfor cert.filed,No. 2005-CP-26-3289 (S.C. Jan. 11, 2012).
142. 852 F. Supp. 2d 682, 686 (D.S.C. 2012).
143. See id. at 684-85.
144. Id. at 685-86.
145. 296 S.C. 241, 371 S.E.2d 796 (1988).
146. See id. at 242, 371 S.E.2d at 797.
147. Id. at 246-47. 371 S.E.2d at 799: see also Cole, supra note 18, at 35 (citing Ost, 296 S.C.
at 246-47, 371 S.E.2d at 799; Kincaid v. Landing Dev. Corp., 289 S.C. 89, 96, 344 S.E.2d 869, 874
(Ct. App. 1986)) ("[T]he general discussion in Ost mirrored the 'amalgamation as blurriness'
conclusion of Kincaid.").
148. 322 S.C. 316, 471 S.E.2d 736 (Ct. App. 1996).
149. Id. at 318. 471 S.E.2d at 737.
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amalgamation could bind two corporations together for purposes of establishing
proper service of process.
IV. THE IMPACT OF AMALGAMATION
4. Elements ofAmalgamation
The doctrine of amalgamation fundamentally alters corporate jurisprudence
in South Carolina. Notably, the court of appeals, when establishing the doctrine
in Kincaid cited no cases or statutes in support of its ruling." Nor did the court
provide any analysis of whether the defendants observed corporate formalities or
of other established means of disregarding the corporate form in South
Carolina.152
None of the previously discussed cases expressly delineate the elements of
amalgamation.
However, a list of possible elements becomes readily apparent
by reading the opinions: (1) shared owner/shareholders, (2) shared officers, (3)
shared office location, (4) shared employees, and (5) other evidence that the
companies present themselves to the public as sharing common interests.14
These elements focus on factors from the first prong of the Sturkie test that
South Carolina courts have de-emphasized. The important factors in the first
prong of the Sturkie test deal with misappropriation of funds for personal use;
however, amalgamation emphasizes a lack of corporate formalities leading to a
blurring of corporate entities-an arguably lower standard for applying the
doctrine.
Noticeably absent from the amalgamation elements is the need for the
plaintiff to demonstrate some sort of deliberate fraud perpetuated through the
corporate form or that injustice or fundamental unfairness will result from

150. Id. at 318 n.2, 471 SE.2d at 737 n.2: see also Cole, supra note 18, at 35 (citing Schenk,
322 S.C. at 318 n.2, 471 S.E.2d at 737 n.2) ("[The] footnote [in Schenk] ... suggests that
[amalgamation] could be used to prove proper service on a corporation.").
151. See Cole, supra note 18, at 34 (citing Kincaid, 289 S.C. at 96, 344 SE.2d at 874) ("The
appellate court provided a list of factors-with no reference to any statutes or common law-wh0ly
the defendant developer, sales, and construction entities should be considered one.").
152. See id. (citing Kincaid, 289 S.C. at 96, 344 S.E.2d at 874) ("The Kincaid court made no
reference to or findings regarding corporate forms, corporate formalities, or even piercing the
corporate veil.").
153. See id. at 35.
154. Cole draws four of these factors from South Carolina case law regarding amalgamation.
See id. The final factor. "shared employees," although not listed in Kincaid, has been found to be
an "indicia of amalgamation of interests" in every successful amalgamation since that case.
155. See, e.g., Hunting v. Elders, 359 S.C. 217, 225, 597 S.E.2d 803, 807 (Ct. App. 2004)
(discussing the Sturkie factors that cowls consider less important when deciding whether to pierce
the corporate veil). Nothing in the record of Mlagnolia -Northreflects improper fund movement,
misappropriation of funds, or undercapitalization. See Magnolia N. Prop. Owners' Ass'n v.
Heritage Cmtys., Inc., 397 S.C. 348, 359-60, 725 S.E.2d 112, 118 (Ct. App. 2012), petitionfor cert.
filed, No. 2005-CP-26-0044 (S.C. May 21, 2012).
156. See Cole, supra note 18, at 34.
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observing the corporate form.
Perhaps most importantly, the court of appeals
has never acknowledged that the doctrine of amalgamation should be utilized
only after "substantial reflection."158 The absence of this cautionary phrasewhich the South Carolina Supreme Court finds essential for properly piercing the
corporate veil-signifies that the doctrine has a lower standard and may be
applied more freely than other doctrines that allow courts to disregard the
corporate form.
B. Knowu n Effects ofAmalgamation
The court of appeals in Magnolia North gave little reasoning in support of its
ruling. 159 The court merely listed a set of facts it found to be sufficient "indicia
of an amalgamation of interests" between the corporations, thereby justifying the
court's amalgamation of the separate corporate entities.160 In Magnolia North,
the court of appeals effectively used amalgamation to pierce the corporate veil
and hold a parent corporation liable for the torts of its subsidiary.161 However,
the court engaged in no discussion of corporate formalities, fundamental
unfairness, or substantial injustice as South Carolina case law requires.162 Aside
from listing "several indicia of an amalgamation of interests," the court offered
no further analysis to support its use of the doctrine.163
The South Carolina Supreme Court's conclusion that the alter ego doctrine is
merely a means of piercing the corporate veill64 demonstrates why the plaintiff,
when putting forth an alter ego claim, must prove that fundamental unfairness
will ensue if the corporate form is recognized. 165 Drury can be read as Chief
Justice Toal's assertion that, whether a plaintiff asks a court to ignore the
corporate form by piercing the corporate veil or through the alter ego doctrine,
the standard is the same.
Thus, it follows that any doctrine allowing a court to

157. See id. ("Apparently, it is no longer necessary to prove a deliberate or fraudulent attempt
to misuse a corporate entity, nor is it necessary to prove some fundamental unfairness if the
corporate shell is honored.").
158. See, e.g., Sturkie v. Sifly, 280 S.C. 453, 457, 313 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing
Baker v. Equitable Leasing Corp., 275 S.C. 359, 367, 271 S.E.2d 596, 600 (1980)) ("It is settled
authority that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is not to be applied without substantial
reflection.").

159. See Mlagnolia North, 397 S.C. at 359-60. 725 S.E.2d at 118.
160. Id. at 359, 725 S.E.2d at 118.
161. See id. at 360, 725 S.E.2d at 118.
162. See supra notes 114-15 and accompainying text.
163. Magnolia North, 397 S.C. at 358-60. 725 S.E.2d at 118.
164. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
165. See Colleton Cnty. Taxpayers Ass'n v. Sch. Dist. of Colleton Cnty., 371 S.C. 224, 237,
638 S.E.2d 685, 692 (2006) (citing Peoples Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Myrtle Beach Golf& Yacht
Club, 310 S.C. 132, 148, 425 S.E.2d 764, 774 (Ct. App. 1992)).
166. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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disregard the corporate form-including amalgamation-must also satisfy this
standard: the plaintiff has the burden of proving fundamental unfairness.167
The court of appeals in Magnolia North-or any other opinion analyzing the
doctrine of amalgamation-did not force the plaintiff to meet this burden.16 8
Nor did the court provide a reason why amalgamation does not require proof of
fundamental unfairness.
Admittedly, the court attempted to distinguish
amalgamation from piercing the corporate veil. 169 However, the court supplied
no analysis in reaching this distinction, but rather it simply stated that a South
Carolina court can disregard the corporate form even if the requirements for
piercing the veil have not been met.1o
The court also mentioned that amalgamation is one of three theories raised
in Mid-South as a possible means for holding a parent company liable in place of
a subsidiary.1 7 1 However, the court in Mfid-South expressly rejected the notion
that amalgamation is a means to hold a parent liable in place of a subsidiary,
distinguishing Kincaid from Mid-South on that very basis.
The court's shift in
Aagnolia North demonstrates a willingness to expand the scope of
173
amalgamation. 1
It is likely just a matter of time before the court of appeals
utilizes the doctrine of amalgamation to hold shareholders liable. Thus, the
doctrine may soon completely usurp other means of ignoring the corporate form
in South Carolina.
Amalgamation's low standard is in direct contravention of South Carolina
public policy. The General Assembly undoubtedly intended to encourage capital
formation under South Carolina law by granting corporations the statutory
protection of limited liability.14 Historically, South Carolina courts have
recognized the importance of limited liability, dispensing with it only when the
transaction in question exhibited a sufficiently powerful equitable justification

167. See Sturkie v. Sifly, 280 S.C. 453, 459, 313 S.E.2d 316, 319 (Ct. App. 1984).
168. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
169. See Magnolia N. Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Heritage Cmtys., Inc., 397 S.C. 348, 359, 725
S.E.2d 112, 118 (Ct. App. 2012), petitionjfbrcert.filed, No. 2005-CP-26-0044 (S.C. May 21, 2012).
170. Id. The court does mention that the trial court concluded the piercing analysis did not
apply to these facts but engages in no analysis of this statement. Id. at 359, 725 S.E.2d at 118.
171. Id. at 358-59, 725 S.E.2d at 118 (citing Mid-S. Mgmt. Co. v. Sherwood Dev. Corp., 374
S.C. 588. 597-605. 649 S.E.2d 135, 140-44 (Ct. App. 2007)).
172. See Mid-South, 374 S.C. at 605. 649 S.E.2d at 144 ("Kincaid was not a situation in which
one company owed a judgment and the court imposed liability upon the parent company or a
shareholder. Thus, Kincaid is inapplicable to the present action."). But see Pope v. Heritage
Cntys., Inc., 395 S.C. 404. 419-20, 717 S.E.2d 765, 773 (Ct. App. 2011). petitionfor cert.filed,
No. 2005-CP-26-3289 (S.C. Jan. 11, 2012) (utilizing amalgamation to hold a parent company liable
for the torts of its subsidiary). It is not surprising that Pope and Mfagnolia North were decided in the
same manner since they are effectively the same case. See supra note 141. The only difference is
the particular development at issue in each case. Compare Pope, 395 S.C. at 410. 717 S.E.2d at 768
(concerning the construction of the Riverwalk Development condominium complex), with
Magnolia North, 397 S.C. at 356, 725 S.E.2d at 117, petitionjfbr cert.filed, No. 2005-CP-26-0044
(S.C. May 21, 2012) (concerning the construction of the Magnolia North condominium complex).
173. See Cole, supra note 18, at 35-36.
174. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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for doing so, such as fraud or fundamental unfairness.'- Placing the burden of
proof on the party asking the court to disregard the corporate form further
illustrates the traditional rule that a statutory right should not be disposed of
easily.
Amalgamation dispenses with the right of limited liability-a right
created by the General Assembly and recognized by the judiciary through the
common law-without the requisite equitable justification.
Amalgamation also allows a plaintiff to recover from a corporate entity that
has not harmed the plaintiff by breaching some standard. 8 A plaintiff no longer
has to prove each individual claim against each individual defendant. Rather a
plaintiff can lump all the defendants together through amalgamation, prove one
claim as to one defendant, and collect damages from all the defendants.' 9 In
Magnolia North, the three corporations each had separate legal obligations and
duties to the plaintiffs,180 yet each separate entity was held liable for each
entity's breach of a legal obligation. 8 By holding a corporation liable for the
torts of another corporation-absent a legally justifiable reason such as
respondeat superior or piercing the corporate veil-the doctrine will discourage
capital formation under South Carolina law.
Dispensing with the necessity of demonstrating fundamental unfairness in
disregarding the corporate form will also affect capital formation tinder South
Carolina law. Corporations select their place of incorporation based on which
states offer the most favorable laws.
Selecting a location that is more
desirable for investors-the one with the greatest liability protection for
investors-enables a corporation to generate more capital.183 The state with the
most attractive and clear rules for corporations will induce more corporations to
form under its laws, thereby increasing its tax revenue.
South Carolina has
long characterized itself as a business-friendly state.185 However, decisions such
as Magnolia North will undermine this characterization.1 86 Piercing the
corporate veil and the alter ego doctrine are considered extreme remedies and are

175. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
177. See Cole, supra note 18, at 35 ("The new amalgamation appears to erode away some of
the corporate protections as it bypasses the traditional mechanisms established by the courts to
attack the corporate shell.").
178. See id.
179. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 74, at 2; see also Cole, supra note 18, at 35 ("Stated
another way, new amalgamation also blurred the legal claims that were pled in the lawsuits.").
180. See Cole, supra note 18, at 35 (citing Mid-S. Mgmt. Co. v. Sherwood Dev. Corp., 374
S.C. 588, 603, 649 S.E.2d 135, 143 (Ct. App. 2007)).
18 1. See id.
182. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 15, at 5-6.

183. See id.
184. See id. at 6.
185. See WALTER EDGAR, SOUTH CAROLINA: A HISTORY 530 35, 577-80 (1998); see also
Cole, supranote 18, at 35 ("South Carolina often markets itself as a business friendly State.").
186. Cole, supranote 18, at 35-36.
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applied only in a limited number of cases. 8 Every jurisdiction in the United
States recognizes the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil,m but a jurisdiction
that has an even lower standard for ignoring the corporate form-like
amalgamation-is not likely to induce many businesses to organize tinder its
laws. Thus, the expansion of the doctrine of amalgamation will cause South
Carolina to drive away businesses and miss out on much needed tax revenue.
C. PossibleEffects of. Imalganation
The court of appeals has signaled a willingness to expand the doctrine of
amalgamation.189 As previously discussed, amalgamation will likely soon be
utilized to hold shareholders liable for the obligations of a corporation. The
lowered bar for ignoring the corporate form makes the expansion of the doctrine
much easier.19 0 A doctrine that requires a showing of fundamental unfairness
before it may be utilized by the courts cannot easily be transposed to other areas
of the law; however, one that merely requires an "indicia of an amalgamation of
interests" does not require a court to expend great resources in applying the
doctrine in new circumstances. 19 1 This lowered standard, coupled with the fact
that amalgamation may be utilized by courts without substantial reflection,
increases the likelihood that the doctrine will continue its expansion into other
areas of the law. 192
Uncertainty over the expansion of the doctrine will discourage capital
formation under South Carolina law. Businesses choose to form under state laws
that are clearly defined so that managers can predict the consequences of the
corporation's actions. Uncertainty over what actions lead to liability in South
Carolina will discourage or drive away business and, consequently, investment
and tax revenue.

187. See id. at 34. The South Carolina Supreme Court has also acknowledged the extreme
nature of this remedy by acknowledging that "[i]t is settled authority that the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil is not to be applied without substantial reflection." Drury Dev. Corp. v. Found.
Ins. Co., 380 S.C. 97, 101. 668 S.E.2d 798. 800 (2008) (quoting Sturkie v. Sifly. 280 S.C. 453, 457,
313 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ct. App. 1984)) (internal quotations marks omitted).
188. See PRESSER, supra note 59, at §§ 2:1-55 (compiling each states' law on piercing the
corporate veil).
189. The South Carolina Court of Appeals appears willing to use the doctrine to decide
matters of civil procedure. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text. The South Carolina
Supreme Court also utilized similar reasoning to analyze and decide a workers' compensation case.
See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
190. See Cole, supra note 18, at 35-36.
191. See, e.g., supra note 114 and accompanying text (providing one example of the ease with
which a court can amalgamate several corporations with no analysis under the "indicia of ain
amalgamation of interests" standard).
192. The area of the law that would be the most troubling for business-and for South
Carolina's ability to attract new businesses would be tax law. While no case has even remotely
suggested that the doctrine may be utilized for tax purposes the fact that the doctrine appears to be
expanding into seemingly unrelated areas of the law suggests that predicting wvhere the doctrine will
next be applied is not an easy task. See Cole, supra note 18, at 35-36.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAw REVIEW

846

[VOL. 64: 825

This expansion will further harm South Carolina's reputation as a businessfriendly state.m While amalgamation will undoubtedly induce businesses to
incorporate inder other states' laws, it remains to be seen if the doctrine will
encourage previously incorporated South Carolina businesses to relocate. More
specifically, will development companies decide to leave the state to find more
favorable liability laws? The doctrine has thus far been ised primarily on
development companies;194 however, the ease with which South Carolina courts
could expand amalgamation to other areas of the law coupled with their apparent
willingness to do so will likely lead to the doctrine being applied to other types
of businesses.
D. Guidance for Practitioners
The easiest solution for practitioners is to not incorporate a client's business
under South Carolina law. However, if the business must be formed tinder South
Carolina law, there are still ways to protect the client. Attorneys may advise
clients to make sure there is a clear delineation between the corporate entities. In
particular, separately incorporated entities should be sure to have different
locations, corporate officers, employees, letterhead, logos, and information
pamphlets-anything they can do to ensure that the public knows the entities are
separate but j List happen to be affiliated and are not the same business.195
V.

CONCLUSION

The South Carolina General Assembly has made a public policy decision to
grant corporations the statutory right of limited liability in order to encourage
more capital formation under South Carolina law. Until recently, South Carolina
courts have recognized this decision by setting a high bar for disregarding the
corporate form and imposing liability on shareholders or a parent corporation.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that this high standard of fraud,
injustice, or fundamental unfairness is applicable to all doctrines that seek to
ignore the corporate form. Thus, courts may not take away this right unless they
identify a sufficiently powerful equitable justification.
Magnolia North and the doctrine of amalgamation fundamentally alter
corporate law by taking away the statutory protection from extracorporate
liability without the requisite equitable justification. This practice is in direct
contravention of the public policy of South Carolina. The result of this decision
and its progeny will be to drive business out of South Carolina-eliminating
much needed tax revenue for the state.

193. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
194. See Cole, supra note 18, at 33 ("['l]he majority and most significant of [the
amalgamation] cases come from construction defect cases.").
195. See id. at 36 ("Perhaps the best advice ... is to warn ... [clients, specifically those in the
construction business] to be wary of comingling corporate interests . . . .").
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South Carolina cannot afford a system of corporate jurisprudence that
hampers the state's ability to attract businesses. The South Carolina Supreme
Court should grant review to Magnolia North and ensure that the doctrine of
amalgamation is not applied without substantial reflection; that the doctrinelike all doctrines used to ignore the corporate form in South Carolina-must
meet the second prong of the Sturkie test: "that there be an element of injustice
or fundamental unfairness if the acts of the corporation be not regarded as the
acts of the individuals." 96
Phillips L. McWilliams

196. Sturkie v. Sifly, 280 S.C. 453, 457 58, 313 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing
DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 685 (4th Cir. 1976)
(Russell, J.)).
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